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ASYLUM ADJUDICATION: SOME DUE PROCESS
IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION*
John A. Scanlan **
INTRODUCTION
The Refugee Act of 19801 revised and liberalized the grounds for
seeking political asylum in the United States and gave those seeking
withholding of deportation or exclusion new procedural rights.
Since the passage of the Act, the number of pending asylum applica-
tions has increased dramatically, exceeding by recent count
105,000.2 Recent events in countries such as Cuba, Ethiopia, and
Iran, continuing strife in El Salvador and other parts of Central
America, and the likelihood of continued migration from Haiti vir-
tually assure that these numbers will remain high. A flow of this
magnitude has caused a strain on the current asylum processing sys-
tem-a strain that has resulted in long delays in the handling of
particular cases and has encouraged the rendering of assembly-line,
highly politicized decision-making by the Department of State and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, each of which plays a
role in the determination of claims.
Consequently, there has been concerted legislative effort to en-
act new statutory asylum procedures designed to expedite the
processing of such claims by establishing a more efficient body for
the rendering of initial decisions and by restructuring the process
under which initial decisions are reviewed. Two significantly differ-
ent versions of the Simpson-Mazzoli "Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 19811"3 are currently pending in the House and Sen-
* © Copyright 1983, University of Pittsburgh Law Review.
** Assistant Director, Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame Law School. Cur-
rently visiting Fellow, Center for International Studies, Princeton University: A.B., University of
Notre Dame, 1966; M.A., University of Chicago, 1967; Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1975; J.D.,
University of Notre Dame, 1978.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
2. This figure is based on unpublished, unofficial State Department and I.N.S. estimates as
of September 1, 1982.
3. On March 17, 1982, identical versions of the "Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1982" were introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives by Senator Alan Simpson
(R-Wyo.), the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Pol-
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ate respectively. Both place initial determinations in the hands of
"specially designated" immigration judges,4 create a new "United
States Immigration Board" with authority to administratively re-
view those determinations5 and statutorily link "asylum" to "with-
holding of deportation or exclusion." 6 The House bill requires that
the United States Immigration Board be presidentially appointed
and confirmed by the Senate7 and makes no reference to any contin-
uing State Department "advisory" role in asylum proceedings.8
Prior to committee action, the bill had amended the judicial review
provisions set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.)
to provide that "there. . .be no judicial review of a final order of
exclusion or a final order respecting an application for asylum," 9
and that
no court of the United States ... has jurisdiction to review determina-
tions of administrative law judges or of the United States Immigration
Board respecting the reopening or reconsidering of exclusion or depor-
tation proceedings or asylum determinations outside of such proceed-
icy, and Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky.), the Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. The original Bill was designated "S.
2222" in the Senate, "H.R. 5872" in the House. It is referred to below as "S. 2222/H.R. 5872."
The Senate Bill was amended in Committee and on the floor, where it passed, 80-19, on August
17, 1982. It is referred to below as "S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982)" [S. 2222]. The House
Bill, after mark-up, was replaced by a clean bill, H.R. 6514, which incorporating Committee
amendments, was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee on September 28, 1982. It is
referred to below as "H.R. 6514, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)" [H.R. 6514].
At the time this article was written, a printed report on S. 2222, as amended, was available.
See S. REP. No. 485, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). H.R. 6514 is reported at H.R. REP. No. 890,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). For detailed information on the content of H.R. 6514 and its relation-
ship to other versions of the bill, the author thanks staff members of the Senate and House sub-
committees who were generous with their time, and S. Masanz and J. Vialet whose report
prepared for the Congressional Research Service, "Section-by-Section Comparison of the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1982, S. 2222/H.R. 5872 as Introduced, S. 2222 as Passed by
the Senate, and H.R. 6514 as Reported," has proved most helpful.
4. S. 2222, § 124(a)(2) (referring to such officers as "immigration judges"); H.R. 6514,
§ 124(a)(1) (referring to such officers as "administrative law judges").
5. S. 2222, § 122(a); H.R. 6514, § 122(a).
6. S. 2222, § 124(a)(3), (b); H.R. 6514, § 124(a)(3), (b).
7. H.R. 6514, § 122(a).
8. Under current regulations---although nowhere required by statute-district directors of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) and immigration judges hearing asylum
claims submit each case to the Department of State's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs (B.H.R.H.A.) for an "advisory opinion." See 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 (1982).
For a critique of the evidentiary standards employed in compiling such "advisory opinions,"
see Scanlan, Who isa Refugee? Procedures and Burden of Proof Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 5
IN DEFENsE OF THE ALiEN, 23-37 (1983).
9. S. 2222/H.R. 5872, § 123(b) (proposing amendment to I.N.A. § 106(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ ll05a(b)(l) (1976)). See also S. 2222/H.R. 5872, § 123(a)(6).
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ings, the reopening of an application of asylum because of changed
circumstances, [or] the Attorney General's denial of a stay of execution
of an exclusion or deportation order. l
This provision would have made the new United States Immigra-
tion Board the exclusive agency for reviewing all asylum determina-
tions and might have precluded collateral review under class action
lawsuits brought under authority of Section 279 of the I.N.A."
A number of major amendments in the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, however, have significantly liberalized the opportunity for
review afforded to asylum applicants whose request for withholding
has been denied. Thus, the House bill in its present form will per-
mit the Courts of Appeals to review all decisions of the Immigration
Board, including all denials of asylum.' 2 The courts will have au-
thority directly to review decisions affecting excludable aliens, who
at present have no access to the judiciary except through habeas
corpus proceedings.' 3 Though prohibitions against indirect or col-
lateral review of asylum decisions are retained by the House Bill,
the scope of habeas corpus is expanded beyond that authorized by
the Senate Bill. Denial of due process may be litigated to the extent
permitted by present law' 4 and, in particular, habeas corpus pro-
ceedings may be brought as class-action lawsuits.' 5
10. Id (proposing amendment to I.N.A. § 106(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § l105a(b)(3) (1976)).
11. I.N.A. § 279, 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1976) provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and crimi-
nal, arising under any provisions of this [8 U.S.C.] title.
This language must be distinguished from the considerably more limited grant of jurisdiction to
the district court to hear appeals relating to individual exclusion and deportation decisions. See
I.N.A. § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1976). For a discussion of how I.N.A. § 279 comes into play when
systematic government conduct is at issue, see infra note 83, and accompanying text.
12. H.R. 6514, § 123(a)(9) would grant the Courts of Appeals limited jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether (1) an immigration law judge or the Immigration Board properly exercised its juris-
diction over an asylum claim; (2) the determination with respect to such a claim was in accordance
with applicable statutes and regulations; (3) such statutes or regulations were constitutional; and
(4) the decision upon which a final order was based was arbitrary or capricious.
13. See S. REP. No. 485, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1982) (Constitutionally-guaranteed
right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in asylum cases exists, provided that the alien is in actual or
constructive custody).
14. Thus, the Senate Bill, as amended, is identical with S. 2222/H.R. 5872, § 123(b). Both
acknowledge the right of habeas corpus only to the extent guaranteed by the Constitution. Yet the
Senate Report, id, at 13, notes that the right of habeas corpus set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)
may be identical in scope to "the 'privilege of the writ of habeas corpus' guaranteed in U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 9, c.2. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038 (1970)."
15. H.R. 6514, § 123(b) (would permit habeas corpus petitions to be brought on an individ-
ual or multiple-party basis).
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The Senate bill, on the other hand, as modified in committee,
would permit "summary exclusion" of aliens who have not yet en-
tered the country, unless they specifically claim asylum. 16 Unlike a
similar House provision requiring all cases to go before an immigra-
tion judge for initial processing, 7 the Senate bill thus permits exclu-
sion without any adjudication and maximizes the possibility that
individuals with valid refugee claims will be returned to their coun-
try of origin before the claims are raised. The Senate bill also places
the appointment of the Immigration Board in the hands of the At-
torney General, with no requirement of Senate confirmation, 18 and
stipulates a role for the State Department in the asylum process.
Specifically, the Department must make human rights reports avail-
able "on a continuing basis" for use as "general guidelines" in mak-
ing asylum determinations 19 and has the opportunity to "submit
comments to the immigration judge" on individual cases brought to
its attention by the I.N.S. 20 Finally, the Senate bill, while retaining
the basic restrictions on administrative review in the original House
bill, permits the Attorney General to overrule the Immigration
Board.21 In such a case, the Attorney General's decision will be re-
viewable by the Court of Appeals.22
The purpose of this article is to analyze some of the due process
implications of the proposed changes in asylum determination and
review. It will be argued that although Congress has considerable
discretion in defining the procedures to be employed in excluding
aliens seeking to enter the United States or seeking to remain here
after the institution of deportation proceedings, the issue presented
is not due process with respect to exclusion or deportation but
rather, is due process with respect to asylum or its close relative, the
withholding of deportation or exclusion. The ramifications of this
distinction, and of Congress' unwillingness to abrogate the privilege
of "non-returnability" for those capable of demonstrating probable
persecution in their country of origin, will thus be examined. In the
16. S. 2222, § 121(a)(2). It is notable that the Senate Bill more closely represents the position
of the Reagan Administration in a number of respects.
17. H.R. 6514, § 121.
18. S. 2222, § 122(a)(1).
19. S. 2222, § 124(a) (adding proposed § 208(a)(1)(B)(i)).
20. Id (adding proposed § 208(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
21. S. 2222, § 122(a).
22. S. 2222, § 123(a).
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light of the examination, a number of constitutional difficulties with
the changes proposed by the Senate will be discussed.
I.
"Due process," as the term is commonly used, has three distinct
meanings. The least problematic refers both to the procedures the
government actually employs when it impinges on the property or
liberty interests of a private party, and to the list of rules-statutory
or administrative-that regulate the government's conduct. Due
process, so delineated, is strictly procedural. Thus, if the I.N.S.
chooses to incarcerate or to dispose of the claims of those seeking
asylum in a manner not authorized by legally promulgated regula-
tions or the agency's operating instructions, a legal remedy exists via
a habeas corpus proceeding 3 or a class action law suit.24 Yet in both
instances, the promulgation of a new regulation or the issuance of
new operating instructions can prospectively validate otherwise en-
joinable conduct and, permit a resumption of expedited asylum
processing or a renewal of detention. Where the sole grounds for a
due process complaint are that the government has ignored the rules
it is bound to follow, no principle prevents the government from
changing those rules whenever it desires.
Due process, however, is concerned not only with adherence to
established procedural rules but also with the conformity of such
rules to more basic societal values. In this sense, the term is norma-
tive and looks to the fundamental "fairness" or "unfairness" of the
government's action as it affects or might affect particular individu-
als. Determining what conduct is "fair" with respect to particular
parties necessitates evaluating the threat to private interests posed
by governmental conduct. Two distinct types of evaluation inform
due process theory and, to a lesser degree, due process jurispru-
dence. The first type, which is favored by those who represent pri-
vate parties, is essentially absolutist. Looking to sources as diverse
23. Habeas corpus is the exclusive judicial remedy available for excludable aliens denied
asylum. See I.N.A. § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1976); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281,
1286, 1289-90 (5th Cir. 1977).
However, aliens who have formally entered the United States and are ordered deported may
seek a review of administrative failure to withhold deportation on grounds of probable persecu-
tion by perfecting an appeal in the Court of Appeals.
24. See, ag., Jean v. Meissner, 90 F.R.D. 658 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Haitian Refugee Center v.
Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aI'd 676 F.2d 1023 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Bertrand v. Sava,
535 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
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as natural law theory, the custom of the ages, and specific passages
of the United States Constitution, it argues that certain sorts of
threatened deprivation are so fundamentally violative of individual
rights, or are so fraught with that potential, that the government
must either be enjoined from acting at all or have its actions rigidly
limited through the elaboration of "constitutional" procedural
standards.
The great body of substantive due process law from the days of
Lochner,25 when the "right" of private contract was put beyond the
reach of governmental control, to the days of Griswold,26 when the
right of private contraception was put beyond the reach of legisla-
tive interference, is absolutist, as are the many procedural cases
guaranteeing "some sort of hearing" 27 for those threatened with loss
of liberty or deprivation of a significant property interest. As will be
noted below, there are problems with applying this sort of absolu-
tism to immigration cases involving excludable aliens, since in such
cases the courts have been reluctant to find any fundamental inter-
ests implicated or have completely subordinated the interest of the
individual to that of the government. Yet it is noteworthy that at
least since 1915 "deportation [cannot] be ordered without a fair
hearing, notice of the charges, an opportunity to defend, to examine
and cross-examine witnesses and to be represented by counsel," 28
and that since 1966, no deportation order may be entered unless the
government proves by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
that the facts alleged as the grounds of deportation are true.29
Opposed to an absolutist conception of due process is a more
elaborate method of evaluation in which the interests of the private
party are given significant attention but are balanced against the in-
terests of the government. It is clear that governmental interests
have always been important to the courts and have often prevailed
over the interests of individuals harmed by governmental conduct
when the interests alleged are substantial, such as those involving
25. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (the Federal Constitution prevents states from
passing maximum work hours legislation, since such legislation interferes with the right of indi-
viduals to enter into contracts).
26. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ("due process embraces the right of'mari-
tal privacy' ").
27. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 and nn. (1974). See also Friendly, Some Kind
of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1267 (1975).
28. Gordon, Due Process of Law in Immigraion Proceedings, 50 A.B.A.J. 34, 34 (1964).
29. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 276 (1966).
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national security in time of war. Although Judge Friendly noted in
Wolff v. McDonnell that "[d]eprivation of liberty, even conditional
liberty, is the harshest action the state can take against an individual
through the administrative process, ' 30 during World War II
thousands of Japanese-Americans were administratively detained
with the blessing of the Supreme Court and the approval of one of
its most "liberal" members, the late Justice Douglas.31 The example
is extreme, but the principle is not. The government can argue that
due process is relative, and that certain individuals in certain cir-
cumstances are entitled to less protection than others in similar cir-
cumstances: thus the assertion of the Supreme Court in one case
that "[d]ue process . . . is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances" 32 and in an-
other that "[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands. ' 33 In Mathews v.
Eldridge the Court summarized earlier cases and explicitly adopted
a specific balancing rationale:
that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally re-
quires consideration of three distinct factors: first the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.34
Where, as in immigration cases, the process of balancing gives
greater weight to the governmental interest than to the interest of
the private party, the process can lead to a new species of absolutism
in which whatever sort of process the government grants will be
deemed "due."
II.
In examining the due process implications of the present system of
30. Friendly, supra note 25, at 1296.
31. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944). Justice Douglas voted with the majority in both decisions. However, inExparle
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), he wrote the majority opinion refusing to apply the executive order
upheld in Korematsu to persons of Japanese ancestry whose loyalty was not questioned by the
government.
32. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
33. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
34. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
administrative and judicial review of political asylum decisions or
decisions to grant or deny withholding of deportation or exclusion,
and in examining the implications of proposed changes in that sys-
tem now pending before Congress, it is important to begin with an
awareness that the governmental function involved is directly re-
lated to immigration control. With respect to that function, the
courts have traditionally recognized the government's assertions of
interest, either by refusing to permit a higher degree of judicial re-
view of administrative actions than required by statute35 or by dis-
playing extreme deference in review.36 Conversely, the courts have
paid relatively little attention to similar assertions by aliens or their
representatives, particularly if the aliens have not yet physically en-
tered the United States, or if, by virtue of a legal fiction, they are
physically present but deemed not to have effected entry and are
hence "excludable." 37 In 1972 the Supreme Court, relying on "an-
cient principles of the international law of nations"3 8 and strong ju-
dicial precedent,39 asserted that "the power to exclude aliens is
'inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal interna-
tional relations and defending the country against foreign encroach-
ments and dangers-a power to be exercised exclusively by the
political branches of government.'-4o
By validating the "exclusive exercise" of the exclusionary
power via the political branches of government, the Court has con-
tinued to lend support to the general proposition that review of im-
migration decisions, whether by judicial or administrative bodies, is
a matter of legislative grace rather than constitutional right.41 This
35. See, ag., Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968). But see Shaughnessy v. Pe-
dreiro, 349 U.S. 48,(1955); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); and Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18
(1964).
36. See, ,-g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) ("We hold that when the
executive exercises [his] power [to exclude communists] on the basis of a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look behind the exercise of that discretion .... What...
other grounds may be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification what-
soever is advanced is a question we neither address nor decide in this case.").
37. See Shaughnessy v. United States exreL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1952) ("[Hlarborage
at Ellis Island is not an entry into the United States"; "temporary refuge on land. or [continu-
ous tenure] aboard ship" have identical legal consequences.).
38. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
39. Id at 765-66. The origins of the precedent were traced back to The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
40. 408 U.S. at 765.
41. See, ,g., United States ex re. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) ("Admis-
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was clearly the view of the first Justice Harlan in 1895. Writing for
the Court in a decision denying judicial review to an excludable
alien, he stated:
The power of the Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United
States, or to proscribe the terms and conditions upon which they may
come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard
enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial inter-
vention, is settled by our previous adjudications.4 2
A similar position was taken by the Court more than half a century
later in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, which permitted administrative of-
ficers, during a time of national emergency, to carry out summary
exclusion without the benefit of any hearing whatsoever.43 The
Court stated:
Mhe decision to admit or exclude an alien may be lawfully placed with
the President, who may in turn delegate the carrying out of this func-
tion to a responsible executive officer of the sovereign, such as the At-
torney General. The action of the executive official under such
authority is final and conclusive. Whatever the rule may be concerning
deportation of persons who have gained entry into the United States, it
is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by
law, to review the determination of the political branch of government
to exclude a given alien.44
The only apparent exception to the principle of non-justiciability
that was elucidated in Knauff is the long-standing but limited right
of judicial access granted to excludable aliens via a habeas corpus
proceeding-a right that is of constitutional rather than statutory
origin. 45
Recent Supreme Court decisions addressing the reviewability
of legislative classifications affecting the rights of aliens to enter the
United States or of those not formally admitted to receive social
benefits have continued to emphasize the limited authority of the
courts to review essentially "political" decisions with respect to such
sion of aliens to the United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Govern-
ment. Such privilege is granted only upon such terms as the United States shall prescribe.").
42. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895).
43. United States ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
44. Id at 543.
45. See supra note 14. Thus, the Supreme Court in Ekin v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660
(1892) permitted an excludable alien seeking an opportunity to land in the United States access to
the federal courts via a habeas corpus proceeding despite the fact that no statute so provided, and
that the immigration treatment he sought was not required by statute.
1983]
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aliens.46 Thus they lend additional support to the longstanding
view, boldly expressed in Knauff, that "[w]hatever the procedure au-
thorized by Congress is [for exclusion], it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned." 47 If this view is applicable to asy-
lum adjudication proceedings, then at least to the extent that those
proceedings affect applicants who are potentially excludable rather
than deportable, no legal issues are raised with respect to appropri-
ateness of the review format proposed by the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill
in any of its versions. The governmental interest will be paramount,
no interest-balancing will be required, and the only issue, clearly
addressable via a writ of habeas corpus, will be whether the proce-
dures for determining and reviewing claims, as set forth in statute
and by regulation, are actually being followed.48
III.
Given the reluctance of the Supreme Court in any recent decision to
renounce precedent-in this instance, a line of cases that constitutes
"not merely 'a page of history' . . .but a whole volume" 49-it is
highly unlikely that anyper se legislative limitation on the right of
aliens to enter the United States will be found to be an unconstitu-
tional denial of due process. Thus, should Congress abolish the
present provisions of the I.N.A. providing for asylum and the with-
holding of exclusion, renounce the 1967 Protocol relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, 50 and subject all aliens not yet in the United States
to summary exclusion proceedings, irrespective of claimed persecu-
tion, such action--despite its patent inhumanity and clear disregard
for international legal standards-might well prove nonjusticiable.
Similarly, if the statutory and treaty provisions providing for with-
46. See, eg., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82
(1976).
47. 338 U.S. 521, 544 (1950).
48. See S. Rm. No. 485, supra note 3, at 14:
the restriction on judicial review [proposed by the Senate] is not intended to prevent a
federal court from correcting through habeas corpus proceedings a violation of due pro-
cess. On the other hand, the Committee intends that there be no judicial review of the
merits of any individual asylum case, and no judicial review of the procedural aspects of
any particular adjudication unless the petitioner has alleged procedural defects which are
fundamental and clearly prejudicial.
49. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (citation omitted), cited with approval in Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-93 n.4 (1977) and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
50. Done Jan. 21, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into
force Oct. 4, 1967, entered into force for U.S. Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Protocol].
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holding of deportation and non-refoulement (non-returnability)
were abolished, deportable aliens might well find that probable per-
secution afforded them no protection in the United States courts.5 '
Thus, it is likely that the right to seek asylum or withholding is no
more absolute than is the right to obtain an abortion at public
expense.52
Yet nothing in the Simpson-Mazzoli bill suggests that Congress
has any intention of limiting the substantive right it granted by
treaty in 1968 and fully incorporated into domestic law in 1980. In-
stead, both the Senate and House bills retain the I.N.A. provisions
for statutory asylum and the provisions that modified the "withhold-
ing of deportation" provisions of I.N.A. § 243(h) to provide for
withholding of exclusion.5 3 Nor, as the Senate Report makes clear,
do any of the provisions of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill "change the
mandatory nature of the relief under I.N.A. § 243(h)" S4 that was
first established in 1980.
Here a distinction must be made between "asylum" and "with-
holding". "Asylum" can be granted before an order of exclusion or
deportation issues. As set forth in I.N.A. § 208, asylum is a matter
of administrative discretion. Asylum, if granted, gives the recipient
a right to remain in the United States until the well-founded fear of
persecution disappears. During the asylum period the recipient,
under some circumstances, will be permitted to adjust his or her sta-
tus to that of permanent resident.55 "Withholding of deportation or
exclusion," as set forth in I.N.A. § 243(h), is modeled on the opera-
51. A more difficult question was presented prior to the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act,
when the protection afforded by the 1967 Protocol was, in literal terms, more extensive than the
provisions of I.N.A. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976) (prior to amendment). The position com-
monly taken by administrative agencies and the courts was that the 1967 Protocol afforded rights
no more extensive than those granted by statute. See In re Dunar, I. & N. Dec. (BIA 1973); Pierre
v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.
1977).
The Refugee Act of 1980 has recently been interpreted as bringing domestic law into con-
formity with international standards. See infra note 67.
52. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
53. The 1980 revisions of I.N.A. § 243(h), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980),
qualify the circumstances under which the Attorney General may "deport or return (emphasis
added) an alien whose life or physical safety is threatened. This clause, which is reflected in
current regulations, makes the section applicable to aliens in deportation as well as exclusion
proceedings. See eg., 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3(b), 208.10(0 (1981).
54. S. REP. No. 745, supra note 3, at 37.
55. Such adjustment of status is controlled by the provisions of I.N.A. § 209, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159. In general, only 5,000 asylees per year can adjust their status, and no adjustment can
occur until a year has elapsed from the grant of asylum.
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rive language of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention5 6 It is equally
applicable to aliens at a port of entry or already physically present
in the United States but is not available until deportation or exclu-
sion proceedings commence.57 Withholding gives the successful ap-
plicant no positive immigration status; that is, excludable aliens can
still be excluded and deportable aliens deported. But under the
terms of both the treaty and the statute, no alien whose life or physi-
cal safety is threatened because of his race or religion, political opin-
ion, or membership in a particular social group can legally be
returned to the country of threatenedpersecution so long as the threat
persists. As the Refugee Act of 1980 and several Courts of Appeals
cases interpreting it make clear, the government must withhold de-
portation or exclusion if probable persecution can be shown.58
Withholding thus creates an entitlement that is at once more
limited and more unequivocal than statutory asylum. The entitle-
ment is more limited than asylum because it does not necessarily
permit the grantee to remain in the United States, although that
may be the practical effect of a decision in his favor.59 Yet the enti-
tlement is also more unequivocal than asylum because it requires
the government fairly to evaluate every claim and to observe the
principle of non- refoulement even after excludability or de-
portability is found, provided that probable persecution is shown.
Withholding is therefore the final recourse of an alien claiming per-
secution: it permits the alien to claim protection as a matter of stat-
utory and treaty right when it is not afforded as a matter of
56. Article 33(1) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Done July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as 1951 Convention] provides:
No contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
In operative terms, this provision is identical to I.N.A. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV
1980), which provides:
(I) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien... to a country if [he]
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
57. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1982).
58. See, eg., Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982); McMullen v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Braithwaite v. INS, 633 F.2d 657
(2d Cir. 1980).
59. Thus, for example, because under present law an excludable alien must be returned to hir
country of origin, a finding of probable persecution should prevent exclusion proceedings from
being completed. See I.N.A. § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1976).
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administrative grace.60 The law at present recognizes the funda-
mental distinction between statutory asylum and withholding by
providing more extensive procedural rights to those seeking with-
holding. Thus, it appears that a denial of asylum by an immigration
judge is not reviewable as a matter of right in any forum, adminis-
trative or judicial.61 On the other hand, a denial of withholding is
subject to de novo review before the currently constituted Board of
Immigration Appeals,62 may be collaterally attacked thereafter
through law suits in the district courts by bringing class actions al-
leging systematic violation of I.N.S. procedures,63 and, in the case of
deportable aliens, may ultimately be reviewed by the Court of
Appeals."4
The question presented by the changes currently proposed in
asylum adjudication procedures therefore is not whether Congress
may abolish the right to non- refoulement, nor even whether it may
provide for the summary exclusion of aliens, but rather, given the
continuing commitment of the Congress to the principle of non-
refoulement, whether the changes it is presently proposing meet the
requirements of due process.
Before 1970, this question would have had little constitutional
relevance, since it is clear that the opportunity to seek asylum is, in
traditional terminology, a "privilege" rather than a "right". Yet in
that year, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 65 which ordered that a hearing not provided by
statute or existing administrative procedures be held before the gov-
ernment was permitted to cut off public assistance benefits, even
though these benefits were not constitutionally required. In
Goldberg, the Court rejected the governmental contention that be-
cause "public assistance benefits are a 'privilege' and not a 'right,'"
60. It has not been settled as to whether the provisions of the 1967 Protocol, as it incorpo-
rates the 1951 Convention, are "self-executing," and thus an independent source of rights for an
asylum applicant. See Vigile v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002, 1018 n.28 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds sb nom. Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
61. Although current regulations (see 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1982)) administratively link "asylum"
and "withholding" proceedings, they remain statutorily distinct. Thus, the finding in Fleurinor v.
INS, 585 F.2d 129, 135 (5th Cir. 1978) that "[a] 'feared persecution' claim under § 243(h)... is
part and parcel of the deportation proceeding" while "[a]n asylum claim, on the other hand, can
obviate the need for any deportation proceedings at all" continues to be applicable.
62. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5, 236.7 (1982).
63. See, eg., Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), afj'd 676
F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1982); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
64. LN.A. § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1976).
65. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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no hearing rights could be implied.6 6 Two years later, in Board of
Regents v. Roth, Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, stated that
"the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction be-
tween 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the appli-
cability of procedural due process rights . . .. [T]he Court has
required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond
the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process. ' 67
The Goldberg line of cases is consistent with the distinction
made in 1954 by Justice Frankfurter in Galvan v. Press, namely, that
while the "formulation of [immigration] policies is entrusted exclu-
sively to Congress," in their "enforcement . . . the Executive
Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards
of due process. '68 Galvan's underlying rationale-that property
and, in particular, liberty interests, however created, are entitled to
procedural protection-is clearly relevant to requests for withhold-
ing of deportation or exclusion. The statutory and treaty provisions
establishing withholding (or non- refoulement) are both based on the
objective of protecting individuals from the ultimate deprivations of
liberty, namely, persecution and death. In having chosen to extend
protection to those facing persecution, Congress must therefore be
presumed to intend the natural consequence of that act. "Due pro-
cess," in the context of I.N.A. § 243(h) application processing, is not
merely "what the Congress says it is," but, instead, is the minimal
set of procedures that will guarantee that the applicant has the right
to be heard and that the hearing is fundamentally fair. In determin-
ing whether these standards have been met, the principles of fairness
incorporated in the international standards to which the United
States has adhered in its ratification of the 1967 Protocol and the
I.N.A.6 9 as well as the more general standards elucidated by general
domestic legal principles must be followed.
IV.
The guidance provided by controlling international standards sug-
gests that the currently proposed House procedures for adjudicating
asylum claims will fulfill the requirements of due process in every
respect. The Senate bill is considerably more problematic because
66. Id at 261-63 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)).
67. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
68. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
69. See Stevic v. INS, 678 F.2d 401, 407-10 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Scanlan, supra note 6.
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of the differential treatment it affords applicants who are excludable
rather than deportable and because of the continuing State Depart-
ment role it delineates.
The relevant texts are Articles l(A)(2) and 33(1) of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the interpretation
of their terms by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (U.N.H.C.R.). Article 33(1), which serves as the basis for
I.N.A. § 243(h),7o restricts the right of every contracting state to "ex-
pel or return" any refugee except those who, under Article 33(2),
constitute "a danger to the security" of the country of refuge, or who
may be deemed to constitute a danger to the community because of
the commission of a serious non-political crime. An implied defini-
tion of "refugee" exists in Article 33 which is fully consistent with
that set forth in Article l(a)(2) and, despite a Senate interpretation
adjudging it more restrictive, probably as extensive. Both the Arti-
cle 33 and the Article l(A)(2) definition are consistent with that set
forth in I.N.A. § 101(a)(42).71 A finding of refugee status under
I.N.A. § 101(2)(42) is a necessary predicate of asylum under INA
70. See supra note 56.
71. Article 1 A.2 of the 1951 Convention, supra note 56, as modfed by Art. 1(2) of the 1967
Protocol supra note 48, defines a "refugee" as a person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality [or former habitual residence] and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country.
This definition contains no specific reference to a "threat" to an individual's "life or freedom", as
does Article 33(1).
The 1951 Convention definition has been adopted with only minor changes in I.N.A.
§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (Supp. IV 1980), which in the aftermath of the 1980 Refugee
Act, defines the term "refugee." The discretionary grant of asylum under I.N.A. § 208, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (1976) is applicable to refugees, who must demonstrate such well-founded fear. The cur-
rent position of the Senate is that applicants for withholding under I.N.A. § 2-13(h), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(b) (1976) must demonstrate something more than fear, i.e., must demonstrate the existence
of the threat giving rise to that fear. Thus, S. REP. No. 745, supra note 3, at 37 states:
deportation of aliens denied asylum is subject to the treaty obligations of the United Na-
tions under the Protocol .... Such treaty obligations require that the United States not
return an alien to a country where his 'life or freedom' would be threatened. ... There-
fore, where the versecution' involved is not so severe as to threaten Ife orfreedom. . . then
the Attorney General may deport the alien.
(emphasis added).
This interpretation of I.N.A. 243(h) was never employed by Congress when the 1980 Refugee
Act was drafted. Instead, the House and Senate at that time both announced an intention to
conform U.S. law to international legal standards. See H.R. REp. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1980); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1979). A substantial body of interpretation
existing in 1980 indicated that despite differences in the formulation of Art. L.A2 and Art. 33(1),
the drafters of the 1951 Convention had never intended to distinguish between the circumstances
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§ 208 and is specifically required of applicants for withholding
under every version of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill.
Since 1951, the U.N.H.C.R. has developed a substantial body
of criteria to be used by nations in determining which applicants are
refugees. These criteria are collected and systemized in the
U.N.H.C.R. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status ("Handbook"). 72 In general, they interpret the na-
ture of persecution that entails protection under the 1951 Conven-
tion and 1967 Protocol and provide the appropriate analytical
method of determining whether persecution exists in a particular
case. Although the individual applicant bears the burden of proof,73
the individual's need to be heard, the importance of credibility in
proceedings where hard facts are difficult to obtain, the fact-finders'
obligation to use information from all available sources to deter-
mine that credibility,74 and the necessity of giving the applicant "the
benefit of the doubt"75 in evaluating his or her testimony are
considered.
Nothing in the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol "specifically
regulate[s] ' ' 76 the procedures according to which the appropriate cri-
teria should be applied. Nevertheless, in a report to the United Na-
tions General Assembly, the U.N.H.C.R. has recommended that the
refugee (i.e., non- refoulement) procedures of all countries
should satisfy certain basic requirements. Those basic requirements,
which reflect the special situation of the applicant for refugee status,...
and which would ensure that the applicant is provided with certain essen-
tial guarantees, are the following:
(i) The competent official (e.g., immigration officer or border police
officer) to whom the applicant addresses himself at the border or in the
territory of a Contracting State should have clear instructions for deal-
ing with cases which might come within the purview of the relevant
international instruments. He should be required to act in accordance
with the principal of non-refoulement and to refer such cases to a higher
authority.
of the individuals covered by each. See Weiss, InternationalProtection ofRqugees, 48 AM. J. INT.
L. 193 (1954).
72. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVEN-
TION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1979).
73. Id at 1 196, p. 47.
74. Id
75. Id at 203, p. 48.
76. Id at 189, p. 45.
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(ii) The applicant should receive the necessary guidance as to the pro-
cedure to be followed.
(iii) There should be a clearly ident'fed authority (wherever possible a
Single central authority) with responsibilityfor examining requestsfor ref-
ugee status and making a decision in the first instance.
(iv) The applicant should be given the necessary facilities, including
the services of a competent interpreter, for submitting his case to the
authorities concerned. Applicants should also be given the opportu-
nity, of which they should be duly informed, to contact a representative
of UNHCR.
(v) If the applicant is recognized as a refugee, he should be informed
accordingly and issued with documentation certifying his refugee
status.
(vi) If the applicant is not recognized, he should be given a reasonable
time to appealfor aformal reconsideration of the decision, either to the
same or to a different authority, whether administrative or judicial, ac-
cording to the prevailing system.
(vii) The applicant should be permitted to remain in the country
pending a decision on his initial request by the competent authority
referred to in paragraph (iii) above, unless it has been established by
that authority that his request is clearly abusive. He should also be
permitted to remain in the country while an appeal to a higher adminis-
trative authority or to the courts is pending 77
Although the House bill does not make it entirely clear how the
government will grant potential claimants access to either the asy-
lum/non- refoulement system or the U.N.H.C.R. representative, the
bill otherwise conforms procedurally to the minimal standards elu-
cidated by the U.N.H.C.R. with respect to the competency of those
conducting initial hearings and the conduct of the hearings. The use
of specially trained immigration judges and their participation in
every exclusion and asylum case, when coupled with the omission of
a specific State Department role in the determination process,
should result in fairer initial evaluations than are obtainable under
the present United States system. However, because the Senate bill
establishes summary exclusion as the norm, it is by no means clear
that the immigration officer first handling a case will be under any
pressure to "act in accordance with the principle of non-refoule-
ment" or will in fact do so. It is equally unclear whether every po-
tential applicant will "receive the necessary guidance as to the
procedure to be followed" in claiming refugee status or will be af-
forded any opportunity to contact a U.N.H.C.R. representative.
77. 32 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 12) para. 53(6)(c), U.N. Doc. A/32/12/Add. 1 (19-),
reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 192, p. 46 (emphasis added).
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Under a summary exclusion model the right to remain in the coun-
try of asylum pending appeal may also prove to be illusory, since
the opportunity to apply for asylum before rapid removal from the
country may be the critical issue.
In evaluating the due process implications of summary exclu-
sion as they relate to asylum and, by implication, to withholding,
the emphasis is necessarily on the likely practical implications of
procedures that have not yet been promulgated. Obviously, it is
possible that summary exclusion could be put in the hands of a
dedicated cadre of I.N.S. officials sensitive to the potential asylum
claims of every alien, and responsive to their rights under interna-
tional law. But experience suggests otherwise.78 Similarly, experi-
ence suggests that when the basis of an I.N.S. decision on a
particular claim is predicated on a State Department evaluation of
the claim's merits, international legal standards will often be ig-
nored in the interests of political expediency. 79 The Senate bill's ex-
plicit directive that immigration judges hearing asylum applications
use State Department human rights reports as "general guide-
lines" 80 in making their determinations, with no provision made for
alternative sources of human rights information, thus renews ex-
isting concerns about the use to which so-called State Department
"advisory opinions" will be put. It is possible that the State Depart-
ment will use its power to preclude an individual applicant from
making his or her aslyum claim, given specific language in the Sen-
ate bill that would permit the "Secretary of State [to] submit com-
ments to the immigration judge" with respect to a particular claim.8'
V.
Summary exclusion and the continuing State Department role in the
asylum process have the potential not only of undercutting the gen-
eral principle of non- refoulement but of vitiating that privilege as it
is afforded by I.N.A. § 243(h). Thus summary exclusion may have
the effect of denying a deserving potential applicant of the opportu-
78. Thus, a consistent theme in litigation involving Haitian and Salvadorian asylum appli-
cants has been the unwillingness of those processing their claims to give more than pro forma
attention to the bonafides of their assertions of "well-founded fear." See Haitian Refugee Center
v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aft'd 676 F.2d 1023 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
79. Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.l (9th Cir. 1968); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 200 (5th
Cir. 1975); Cf. Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976).
80. S. 2222, supra note 3, at § 124(a)(l)(B)(i).
81. Id at § 124(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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nity to be heard; State Department intervention may make the hear-
ingproforma and deny the applicant the practical opportunity of
bearing his burden of proof. Yet the due process implications of
each denial are different.
It has already been noted that summary exclusion, at least
under traditional views of the plenary power of Congress to legislate
restrictively with respect to aliens not yet admitted to the United
States, is probably notper se unconstitutional. Yet if such a proce-
dure is enacted, its practice may quickly demonstrate that it is in-
compatible with the guarantee of non-refoulement contained
elsewhere in the I.N.A. and in the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. In such a
case, it would be entirely appropriate for the judiciary to reconcile
the objective of summary exclusion, namely, greater governmental
efficiency in stemming unwanted immigration, with that of non-
refoulement, namely, the protection of all refugees, including those
who have been administratively precluded from filing apparently
valid claims. Since it can be presumed that deserving claimants
would file applications on their own behalf if they were aware of
their legal rights, the appropriate plaintiffs in such a legal action will
probably be third parties with the standing necessary to bring a suit
under I.N.A. § 279,82 which in its present form grants the District
Court general jurisdiction over matters arising under the immigra-
tion laws, including systematic denials of rights afforded by those
laws.83 Although the Senate may have sought to preclude the possi-
bility of bringing such a suit, nothing in its version of the Simpson-
Mazzoli bill clearly succeeds in doing so. Even if such a restriction
could be implied, the observation of Professors Gellhorn and Byse,
which is buttressed with examples from two deportation cases,
might well control: "Although explicit statuory provisions purport-
ing to bar judicial review are not common, on occasion Congress
has directed that designated administrative action shall be final.
When vital personal interests are at stake, finality clauses are given a
restrictive meaning."' 4
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1976).
83. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 459-61 (S.D. Fla. 1980), af'd
676 F.2d 1023, 1035 (1lth Cir. 1982). (In affirming, the Circuit distinguished between the author-
ity to hear cases based on individual deportation orders, and "the authority of a district court to
wield its equitable powers when a wholesale, carefully orchestrated, program of constitutional
violations is alleged." 676 F.2d at 1033.)
84. W. GELLHoRN and C. BysE, ADMiNIsTRATIVE LAW, 220-21 (6th ed. 1975) citing Lloyd
Sabudo Soc'y v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932) and Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
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Prejudicial State Department evaluations of particular claims,
because they arise in the context of ongoing asylum adjudications,
have a somewhat different status. Recent judicial decisions8 5 and
commentary evaluating those decisions8 6 suggest that individual ap-
plicants denied withholding stand a good chance of obtaining rever-
sal of negative determinations that are not based on substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole. All determinations
based primarily on State Department opinions about the "general
conditions" prevailing in particular countries, if rebutted by evi-
dence of persecution particular to the applicant, are inherently sus-
pect.87 The present mechanism for obtaining reversal is for the
applicant to obtain de novo administrative review in the Board of
Immigration Appeals, to be followed, if necessary, by direct re-
course to the Court of Appeals by deportable aliens and discretion-
ary recourse to the District Court under I.N.A. § 279 by excludable
aliens. It is precisely these avenues of review that the Senate bill, as
well as the original version of the House bill, would explicitly abro-
gate through the creation of a new, exclusive reviewing agency, the
United States Immigration Board. The remaining questions to be
addressed are whether such a board, with such responsibilities and
jurisdiction, can ever meet the requirements of due process and if so,
under what conditions.
VI.
It is likely that due process in dealing with asylum claims asserting
the right of non- refoulement, under both prevailing international
and domestic legal standards, requires some avenue of review of ini-
tial negative determinations. It is fairly clear, however, that the
power of review is not limited to the judiciary but can be delegated
exclusively to an administrative body.
Accordingly, the U.N.H.C.R. guidelines, although requiring an
opportunity "for a formal reconsideration of the decision", specify
that such reconsideration can be "either to the same or different au-
85. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981); Stevic v. INS, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.
1982).
86. See Scanlan, supra note 56, at 272.
87. See Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1061-1063 (2d Cir. 1976). Judge Friendly's analysis
in that case lends inevitably to the findings in McMullen and Stevic that under the new refugee
act, the creditable testimony and documentary evidence presented by individual applicants weighs
more heavily than generalized official opinions, unsupported by substantial evidence, about in-
elegibility for withholding of deportation.
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thority [as that which issued the original determination], whether
administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system."88
The United Nations has recently reviewed the procedures for evalu-
ating and reviewing asylum claims in 28 nations, including such
western democracies as Canada, Australia, Austria, West Germany,
and Belgium. Only one of these nations, Lesotho, provided for di-
rect judicial review of the asylum decision by a court of law. Three
others permitted limited review in the indigenous administrative
court system. The remainder permitted the original evaluator to re-
new the evaluation proceeding but provided no hearing before a
second body; permitted a special administrative review board, simi-
lar to the United States Immigration Board, or a specially-desig-
nated government official, to review the initial decision; or made no
provision whatsoever for any type of review, administrative or
judicial.8 9
Domestic law similarly permits review that is exclusively non-
judicial, at least in some circumstances. Whatever right to judicial
review the Constitution affords in certain circumstances, it does not
always afford such a right. According to Professor Jaffe: "Congress,
barring constitutional impediments, may indeed exclude judicial re-
view."9o In Estep v. United States, the Supreme Court stated, "Ex-
cept when the Constitution requires it, judicial review of an
administrative action may be granted or withheld as Congress
chooses." 9' According to Professor Davis:
Cutting offjudicial review of some administrative action is impermissi-
ble in some circumstances. One reason we have so much judicial re-
view of discretion is that our constitutional tradition calls for it.
But [Prof. Raoul] Berger's position ... that all discretion must be re-
viewable for arbitrariness or abuse ... is not at all supported by con-
stitutional doctrine. My position is that some administrative discretion
is unreviewable for arbitrariness or abuse ... under the
Constitution. 92
The assumption underlying this discussion is that review of non-
refoulement determinations is no longer discretionary. Thus, the
question of review is addressed to the minimal protection necessary
88. HANDBOOC, supra note 77, at 192.
89. United Nations General Assembly, Note on Procedures For the Determination ofRfugee
Status Under International Standards (A/AC.96/INF 152/Rev. 1) 21 Sept. 1979.
90. Jafe, ieght to Judicial Review , 71 HARv. L. REV. 401, 432 (1958).
91. 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946).
92. Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-a Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 823, 831 (1966).
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to guarantee that the mandate expressed in Article 33 and I.N.A.
§ 243(h) is actually and fairly carried out by administrative officers.
Review of some sort is clearly necessary to achieve this objective.93
Yet the special judicial deference to immigration-related decision-
making renders it highly unlikely that the courts will be required to
participate as a reviewing body.
Deportation cases provide a useful analogy. For at least a hun-
dred years, the courts have recognized that expulsion implicates a
number of important personal interests of the deportable alien-in-
terests that are comparable to, if not as weighty as, the interests of a
criminal defendant seeking to avoid imprisonment.94 Recognition
of these interests led Congress, over the course of some eighty years,
significantly to expand the opportunity afforded an alien in deporta-
tion proceedings to obtain administrative and judicial review of a
negative decision. Yet the Supreme Court, in a long series of cases,
refused to find any constitutional right of judicial review.95 Thus,
the current law appears to be that stated in 1952 in Carlson v. Lan-
don, namely, that "[tihe power to expel aliens. . . may be exercised
entirely through executive officers, with such opportunity for judi-
cial review as Congress may see fit to authorize or permit." 96 Yet
this broad grant of authority is conditioned by the following lan-
guage: "[t]his power is, of course, subject to judicial intervention
93. The gravamen of current objections to the present asylum process is not only that it is too
slow, but that in too many cases, the government's mandatory duty to grant withholding upon an
applicant's meeting of the burden of proving probable persecution is ignored. The Senate's pro-
posed structure of review appears to be unprecedented in establishing a final, "discretionary" level
of review for a duty which remains by its terms mandatory, by permitting the Attorney General,
upon his determination of the "national interest" (S. 2222, supra note 3, at § 122(a)), to overturn
the findings of the U.S. Immigration Board. Such a structure of review, which would effectively
subordinate the U.S. Immigration Board's Function of quasi-judicial review to the Attorney Gen-
eral's political determination, appears to be the "perfect exemplification of the practices so unani-
mously condemned," Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45 (1950), by President
Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937-the progenitor of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Id at 37, 41-44. It would render nugatory the requirement that adminis-
trative decisions be based on a reviewable record. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271
(1970).
94. See, eg., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952). ("Deportation is not a criminal
proceeding and has never been held to be punishment. No jury sits. No judicial review is guaran-
teed by the constitution. [Yet it] is a particularly drastic remedy.") Cf. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S.
276, 285-86 (1966) (deprivation threatened is so extreme that no deportation can be enforced ex-
cept upon "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for de-
portation are true.").
95. See, ag., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Marcello v. Bonds, 349
U.S. 302 (1955).
96. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952).
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under the paramount law of the Constitution." 97 And in The Japa-
nese Immigrant Case, it was made clear that in deportation proceed-
ings, executive officers cannot, under the Constitution, "arbitrarily
. . . cause an alien... to be deported without giving him the op-
portunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be
and remain in the United States. No such arbitrary power can exist
where the principles involved in due process of law are recog-
nized." 98 Goldberg extended the principles of due process with re-
spect to hearings to privileges of statutory origin. The implication
arising from the fact that administrative agencies cannot act arbi-
trarily is unmistakable: some body must have authority to review
their acts. If that body need not be the courts (outside of the limited
context of a habeas corpus hearing), then at least it must be an ad-
ministrative body disciplining the conduct of administrative of-
ficers.99 Thus, as the Court noted in Japanese Immigrant, the order
of deportation at issue in that case only became "final and conclu-
sive" when administrative means at the appellant's disposal had not
been exhausted: "no appeal was taken to the Secretary from the
decision of the Immigration Inspector." 1 0
97. Id
98. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1893).
99. In the area of immigration, administrative review of initial agency decisions has grown
increasingly systematic, and increasingly independent of the original decisionmaker since 1921,
when an advisory Board of Review was created in the Department of Labor, the agency then
empowered to decide immigration cases. In 1931, the Wickersham Commission recommended
that an independent tribunal for handling deportation cases be established, completely separate
from the agency handling enforcement functions. However, final decisions continued to be made
by the Secretary of Labor upon the recommendation of an advisory board until 1940, when the
Immigration and Naturalization Service was established, and the present Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) created. Approximately 80% of the cases reaching the BIA are never subjected to
any additional review, either because, as in the case of exclusion decisions, statutory appeal is not
available, or becamuse no appeal is taken to the courts. The BIA is not entirely independent of the
INS, since its members are appointed by the Commissioner, and have no statutory tenure of office.
The BIA, under the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1982), may also refer its decisions to the
Attorney General for final decision, although such referrals are in fact rare. Thus, the BIA does
not entirely meet the objective of providing an impartial, non-judicial authority to review INS
decisions, see Levinson, A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 644 (1981). But its existence points, nevertheless, to the sort of long-developing inde-
pendence which is threatened by the provisions of S. 2222. See Roberts, "he Boardoflfmmigration
Appeals: 4 Critica Appraisal, 15 SAN DmO L. Rnv. 29 (1977).
100. 189 U.S. at 102. However, the case was decided during a period when the existence of
the Secretary's review power implied no limitation of any sort on the discretion of the government
in deciding the cases before it.
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VII.
Since Japanese Immigrant, decided 80 years ago, due process juris-
prudence has developed rapidly, although probably less rapidly inimmigration law than in any other area. There has been greater
emphasis on the particular liberty interests implicated by govern-
mental action, greater awareness of the personal effects of particular
deprivations, greater differentiation between the standards of re-
view-and reviewability-applicable to discretionary governmental
conduct on the one hand and mandatory conduct on the other, and
(it is likely) greater willingness to see that administrative officers do
not always act fairly. All these suggest that today a method of re-
view that would permit only the Secretary of a Department to moni-
tor the behavior of his subordinates when such behavior has life-or-
death implications for an asylum seeker would be found constitu-
tionally infirm. I use the word "suggest" because I know of no case
directly on point. Nevertheless I am convinced that the review
mechanism envisioned by the Senate would in fact deny due process
to asylum applicants.
In so suggesting, I am not arguing against the probable legality
of a United States Immigration Board's functioning as the sole
means of reviewing initial asylum and withholding determinations.
Properly constituted as a Title I administrative court or its
equivalent or as an independent administrative agency, such a
board would be fully competent to assess the sufficiency of evidence
elucidated by immigration judges. Appointed by the President and
subject to Senate confirmation, and free of any oversight by the De-
partment of Justice, it could function in a judicial rather than a
political manner to develop fair standards for adjudicating asylum
claims. Such a board could probably do all of this more expedi-
tiously than could a Court of Appeals and arguably might better
balance the interests of the government, which seeks to control im-
migration, and the individual applicant, who seeks to avoid
persecution.
The Senate bill, however, by taking away the Board's indepen-
dence and assiduously rooting out all direct and collateral means of
reviewing its decisions, essentially makes it a political rather than a
quasi-judicial body. By subjecting the Board's decisions to the At-
torney General's veto, the bill further politicizes it. Permitting judi-
cial review of the Attorney General's action after he has exercised
his veto is a hollow concession, since the standards under which the
[Vol. 44:261
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
Court of Appeals would be permitted to overturn the Attorney Gen-
eral are by no means clear.101
Withholding of deportation is an important privilege. It has
been subject to extensive manipulation in the past, to the detriment
of individual applicants. The courts are only now beginning to ad-
dress these abuses of the administrative process. To institutionalize
a system that prevents the courts from continuing their inquiry, yet
substitutes no alternative mechanism for insuring fairness, is surely
to sacrifice due process in the interests of expediency. What is
needed is a better balance--one that finds a clearer equilibrium be-
tween the undoubted interests of the state and the unnegotiable in-
terests of the individual who faces persecution.
101. As proposed by S. 2222, supra note 3, at § 122(a), a decision could be made by the
Attorney General on cases certified to him at his request by the United States Immigration Board.
Such certification would follow a determination on his part that his review was "necessary for the
national interest." The proposed statutory language requires that the Attorney General's decision
then be rendered within thirty days. But it lists no considerations that the Attorney General
would be required to take into account, nor stipulates any evidentiary standard that would be
required before he could reverse a ruling below. In other words, his discretion would be absolute.
Therefore, despite the fact that as proposed by Section 123(b), the Attorney General's decision
would be subject to judicial review under INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), and apparently
would be reviewable on the basis of "substantial evidence in the record considered as whole,"
such evidence would probably be unavailing if the Attorney General asserted that he was acting
within his discretionary authority in order to facilitate some national interest.
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